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Abstract
 
This thesis examines the fundamental transformations in
 
the American Constitution through the adoption of the
 
fourteenth amendment. The fourteenth amendment has been for
 
some years the focal point of the debate about how the
 
Constitution should be interpreted. Chapter One provides a
 
critique of the current debate over original intent
 
jurisprudence. The end of Chapter One and all of Chapter
 
Two is spent identifying and analyzing the principles that
 
the Constitution protects and why it is important to adhere
 
to those principles.
 
The final half of the thesis is dedicated to showing
 
how the transformation occurred, and how the use of the
 
Fourteenth Amendment has brought about changes in the First
 
Amendment.
 
The Conclusion is a summary of the results of Judicial
 
activism and Legislative inaction.
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Modern Day Views Of The American Constitution
 
Our amended Constitution is the lodestar for
 
our aspirations. Like every text worth
 
reading, it is not crystalline. The phras
 
ing broad and the limitations of its provi
 
sions are not clearly marked. Its majestic
 
generalities and ennobling pronouncements
 
are both luminous and obscure. This
 
ambiguity of course calls for the 
interpretation, the interaction of reader 
and text.^ 
The preceding quotation is Justice William Brennan's
 
response on October 12, 1985, to Attorney General Edwin
 
Meese Ill's call for a "jurisprudence of original intent".
 
It is a statement of his judicial philosophy and it illus
 
trates one side of a constitutional argument that is now
 
raging in the United States. Can our judges today be
 
expected to render judicial decisions based on the text of
 
)	our Constitution? Or more accurately, can our judicial
 
system, faced with obviously new and unanticipated ques
 
tions of law in today's modern world, be expected to give
 
decisions based on a 200-year-old text? Justice Brennan
 
does not think so. In the same speech again responding to
 
Meese, the Justice noted that:
 
There are those who find legitimacy in
 
fidelity to what they call 'the intentions
 
of the Framers.' In its most doctrinaire
 
incarnation, this view demands that Justices
 
discern exactly what the Framers thought
 
about the question under consideration and
 
simply follow that intention in resolving
 
the case before them. It is a view that
 
feigns self-effacing deference to the
 
specific judgments to those who forged our
 
original social compact. But in truth, it
 
is little more than arrogance cloaked as
 
humility. It is arrogant to pretend that
 
from our vantage, we can gauge accurately
 
the intent of the Framers on application of
 
principle to specific, contemporary ques
 
tions. All too often, sources of potential
 
enlightenment such as records of the ratifi
 
cation debates provide sparse or ambiguous
 
evidence of the original intention. Typi
 
cally, all that can be gleaned is that the
 
Framers themselves did not agree about the
 
application or meaning of particular consti
 
tutional provisions, and hid their differ
 
ences in cloaks of generality.^
 
The framers had many differences not the least of which
 
was their differing views on slavery. It is true that the
 
language of the Constitution undeniably allows the exis
 
tence of slavery. How could such a document be at once the
 
basis for securing individual freedoms and at the same time
 
allow the existence of slavery? Justice Brennan's answer to
 
that question was:
 
But our acceptance of the fundamental
 
principles [in the Constitution] should not
 
bind us to those precise, at times an anach
 
ronistic, contours. Successive generations
 
of Americans have continued to respect these
 
fundamental choices and adopt them as their
 
own guide to evaluating quite different his
 
torical practices. Each generation has the
 
choice to overrule or add to the funda
 
mental principles enunciated by the Framers;
 
the Constitution can be amended or it can be
 
ignored. . . . The ultimate question must
 
be what do the words of the text mean in our
 
time? The genius of the Constitution rests
 
not in any static meaning it might have had
 
in a world that is dead and gone, but in the
 
adaptability of its great principles to cope
 
with current problems and current needs.^
 
others in agreement with Justice Brennan, claim that
 
these same sentiments were held by the Supreme Court 80
 
years ago. Justice McKenna in Weems v U.S.. held that:
 
Time works changes, brings into existence
 
new conditions and purposes. Therefore, a
 
principle to be vital must be capable of
 
wider application than the mischief which
 
gave it birth. This peculiarity is true of
 
constitutions. They are not ephemeral
 
enactments, designed to meet passing
 
occasions. They are, to use the words of
 
Chief Justice John Marshall, designed to
 
approach immortality as nearly as human
 
institutions can approach it.' The future
 
is their care and provision for events of
 
good and bad tendencies of which its
 
prophecy can be made. In application of a
 
Constitution, therefore, our contemplation
 
cannot be only of what has been, but of what
 
may be.^
 
Another question that needs to be asked is this: If
 
the founding fathers actually did expect the Constitution
 
to be followed as they originally intended, what was the
 
ground of thier expectations? Were they endowed with some
 
special wisdom that allowed them to invest its practical
 
expression in the Constitution? Were they arrogant enough
 
to believe that this special wisdom would last throughout
 
the ages? These questions are in part the arguments used to
 
take the offensive against those who adhere to the doctrine
 
of original intent. But, are these arguments valid? Do
 
they make historical sense? It would seem that this
 
reasoning has been used quite effectively and not without
 
some applause from the original intent side. For example in
 
Brown V Board of Education, which brought about the end of
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racial segregation in public schools, both sides approved
 
of the steps toward equality. There have been cases that
 
can be pointed to and considered successes for the
 
philosophy opposed to original intent. But the facts are
 
that this philosophy is inadequate and outright wrong when
 
observed in a closer way. Here is what four great
 
statesmen have to say about this philosophy;
 
'The Constitution is a mere thing of wax in
 
the hands of the judiciary, which they may
 
twist and shape into any form they please.'
 
•If the policy of the Government upon vital
 
questions affecting the whole people is to
 
be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the
 
Supreme Court, the instant they are made,
 
the people will have ceased to be their own
 
rulers.'
 
•The Court has improperly set itself up as a
 
super-legislature . . reading into the Con
 
stitution words and implications which are
 
not there, and which were never intended to
 
be there . . . We want a Supreme Court
 
which will do justice under the Constitu
 
tion—not over it.'
 
•An activist jurisprudence, one which
 
anchors the Constitution only in the
 
consciences of jurists, is a chameleon
 
jurisprudence of changing color and form in
 
each era.'^
 
These words sound like those of Edwin Meese. The last
 
quotation is the Attorney General's. But the first comes
 
from Thomas Jefferson, the second from Abraham Lincoln, and
 
the third from Franklin D. Roosevelt.
 
The quotations were found in an article written by
 
Stuart Taylor in Current magazine. He sums up the argument
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against Brennan's philosophy this way:
 
Its scorn for the 'Original Intention'
 
approach begs the question of where—if
 
not from those who wrote and ratified
 
the Constitution and its amendments—
 
unelected judges get a mandate to over
 
ride the will of the political majority
 
by striking down democratically enacted
 
laws. The trouble is that judges of all
 
political stripes have gone beyond the
 
Constitution's principles to new circum
 
stances. They have written their own
 
moral and political values into it, pre
 
tending to have found them there. Some
 
times they have interpreted the Con
 
stitution to forbid things explicitly
 
allowed by its language.®
 
Lino A. Graglia in a recent Article writes in a
 
similar verse.
 
The inevitable conclusion that has to be
 
seen is that we would no longer be a
 
government of the people but it boils do
 
wn to whether, the country should be gov
 
erned in regard to basic issues of social
 
policy: whether such issues should be
 
decided by elected representatives of the
 
people, largely on a state-by-state bas
 
is, or, as has been the case for the
 
last three decades, primarily by a majo
 
rity of the nine Justices of the United
 
States Supreme Court for the nation as a
 
whole. . . . nearly every fundamental
 
change in domestic social policy has been
 
brought about not by the decentralized
 
democratic (or, more accurately, repub
 
lican) process contemplated by the Con
 
stitution, but simply by the Court's de—
 
cree. The Court has decided on a nation
 
al basis and often in opposition to the
 
wishes of a majority of the American
 
people, issues literally of life and
 
death, as in its decisions invalidating
 
virtually all restrictions on abortion
 
and severely restricting the use of
 
capital punishment.^
 
Graglia goes on to list additional social implica
 
tions handed down by the Court, such as expansion of
 
criminal rights, limiting state power to control street
 
demonstrations, vagrancy, public morality, pornography,
 
obscenity, nudity, school prayer, aid to religious
 
schools, busing, reapportionment, libel, slander, and
 
many others.
 
It would seem clear that the founders did have an
 
original intention in writing the Constitution. It was
 
not intended to be an exercise in futility that they
 
remained in isolation during the summer of 1787 while
 
hashing out their differences and finally coming to a
 
consensus. They indeed had a plan and an understanding
 
of how the government should work and of the principles
 
that it needed to rest on. That is where the division
 
and misunderstanding stems from as far as this constitu
 
tional debate of original intention is concerned.
 
Brennan believes that the Constitution rests on
 
nothing more than "majestic generalities and ennobling
 
pronouncements." In other words, the Constitution means
 
what the justices say it means at any particular time*
 
It is a changing, organic document that can mean one
 
thing one day and something else the next. To quote Lino
 
Graglia again.
 
The central question presented by con
 
stitutional law—the only question the
 
great variety of matters dealt with
 
under that nubric have in common—is how,
 
if at all, can such power in the hands of
 
national officials who are unelected and
 
effectively hold office for life be jus
 
tified in a system of government sup
 
posedly republican in form and federalist
 
in organization? That notion that a
 
court has 'power to overrule or control
 
the action of the people's representa
 
tives,' Justice Owen Roberts confirmed
 
during the New Deal Constitutional
 
Crisis, is a misconception; the Court's
 
only function in a constitutional case is
 
to lay the article of the Constitution
 
which is involved beside the statute
 
which is challenged and to decide
 
whether the latter squares with the
 
former.®
 
What then does the Constitution rest on? What is
 
the philosophy behind it?
 
The Constitution, I believe, rests on the foundation
 
provided for it in the Declaration of Independence which
 
says, "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all
 
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
 
Creator with certain inalienable rights. Among them is
 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." What does
 
it mean to say that all men are created equal?
 
A member of the Constitutional Convention and a
 
leading Federalist, James Wilson, remarked that.
 
Between beings, who in their nature,
 
powers, and situation are so perfectly
 
equal, that nothing can be ascribed to
 
one, which is not applicable to the
 
other. There can be neither superiority
 
nor dependence with regard to such
 
beings, no reason can be assigned, why
 
anyone should assume authority over
 
others, which may not, with equal propri
 
ety, be assigned, why each of those
 
others should assume authority over that
 
one. To constitute superiority and
 
dependence, there must be an essential
 
difference of qualities on which those
 
relations may be founded.^
 
This is not to say that there are no natural
 
inequalities among humans, only that there are none that
 
would make one being a natural ruler over another.
 
People are to be treated, and to treat others, in such a
 
way as to honor these natural rights granted to them by
 
their Creator, as the Declaration asserts.
 
As Harry V. Jaffa writes in an article published in
 
the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policv;
 
One should not speak of the 'values' of
 
the Constitution, for the Constitution
 
rests upon principles, which are an enti
 
rely different animal. The confusion of
 
principles with values — which in the
 
language of the present day philosophy
 
[i.e. Justice Brennan] and social
 
science means essentially something
 
subjective, is a symptom of the disease
 
from which we suffer, and which, to some
 
extent, makes conservatives not much 
more constructive than their political 
opponents.^® 
Our government, our regime, is based on the natural
 
rights philosophy, and to say that they have no
 
relevance today is to stray far off the path and at
 
worst to jeopardize our system of law. Things do change,
 
and to no one's surprise, the founders could not have
 
anticipated everything that has happened since the
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founding. They could not have seen all the technological
 
advances such as cars, airplanes, or space flight,
 
therefore, it would have been impossible for them to have
 
addressed those specific issues. But I disagree with the
 
opponents of original intention when they say that the
 
principles. need to be changed with the passage of time.
 
It was true 200 years ago that man was entitled to life,
 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness. It is true today,
 
and it will be true a thousand years from now.
 
Graglia has written that.
 
It cannot be too strongly emphasized,
 
therefore, that the Constitution we
 
actually have bears almost no relation
 
to, and is often clearly irreconcilable
 
with the Constitution of Justice
 
Brennan's vision. No more is necessary
 
to rebut all contemporary defenses of
 
judicial activism that a copy of the Con
 
stitution be kept close at hand to
 
demonstrate that the defenders of
 
judicial activism are invariably relying
 
on something else.^^
 
Abraham Lincoln, who understood the Constitution better
 
than almost anyone before or since, said that:
 
Without the Constitution and the Union,
 
we could not have attained the result:
 
but even these are not the cause of our
 
great prosperity. There is something
 
back of these, entwining itself more
 
closely about the human heart, that some
 
thing is the principle of Liberty to
 
all—the principle that clears the path
 
for all—gives hope to all—and, by con
 
sequence, enterprise and industry to all.
 
The expression of that principle, in our
 
Declaration of Independence, was most
 
happy and fortunate . . . The assertion
 
of that principle, at that time, was the
 
word 'fatally spoken,' which has proved
 
an 'apple of gold' to us. The Union, and
 
the Constitution, are the pictures of
 
silver, subsequently framed around it.
 
The picture was made, not to conceal, or
 
destroy the apple; but to adorn and pre
 
serve it. The picture was made for the
 
apple, not the apple for the picture.
 
What Lincoln was explaining, was the genius behind the
 
Constitution and the Union. The reason natural rights
 
are honored as they are is because of the principle of
 
equality expressed in the Declaration of Independence.
 
The principle was to be enshrined by the Constitution,
 
and not the other way around.
 
To summarize this first section, it can be said that
 
according to Justice William Brennan and those that
 
agree with him, the Constitution is based on ennobling
 
values and grand generalities. The framers' intentions
 
can, at best, be glimpsed and, at worst, completely
 
disregarded by the current generation. Crises occurring
 
during this period of time need to be resolved based on
 
what seems right to the judge and does not necessarily
 
need to be connected principally to the Constitution.
 
Over and against this thesis presented by the opponents
 
of "original intention," are the arguments for original
 
intention that claim to be able to understand, not per
 
fectly, but with a certain degree of certainty, the
 
principles that the framers were trying to enshrine in
 
the Constitution. Those principles, known as natural
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rights, can be understood and applied to modern-day
 
legal cases.
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Brinciples of Equality
 
Another issue in the debate is the argument of those
 
who adhere to original intent that the judicial activism
 
of the Court has usurped the proper constitutional auth
 
ority of the legislature. Both conservatives, in the
 
laissez-faire era of the 1890-1930s, and the liberals in
 
the 1950-70S who sought a broad application of the Bill
 
of Rights ot the States, have used the Court as a
 
shortcut around the legislative branch. According to
 
Hamilton in Federalist paper No. 78, the judiciary has
 
the distinct purpose of interpretation and clarification;
 
to tell us what the laws mean. It serves a moderating
 
function between the people and its government. To
 
quote Hamilton,
 
it serves to moderate the immediate
 
mischiefs of those which may have been
 
passed but it operates as a check upon
 
the legislative body in passing them.^^
 
But the court has subtly moved from a position of clari
 
fying and interpreting the laws written by the legisla
 
ture to interpret the laws according to the judges per
 
sonal beliefs. These supralegislative forays by the
 
Court into our political process have resulted in a group
 
of nine justices and its elected officials leading the
 
country, by decree instead of by popular vote.
 
Whether right or wrong, the Court has also found
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significant new principles in the Constitution that
 
cannot, by any stretch, be implied by the framers. For
 
example, the incorporation of the Bill of Rights by the
 
equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. Leonard
 
W. Levy, writing in The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill
 
of Rights: the Incorporation Theory. says this about
 
Charles Fairman's research concerning the incorporation
 
theory;
 
Fairman reviewed the same history that
 
Black had reversed and came to the con
 
clusion that the record 'overwhelmingly'
 
refuted Blacks incorporation thesis. In
 
addressing himself to the immediate back
 
ground of the amendment, Fairman did not
 
only analyze the congressional debates,
 
he also explored the newspapers, the 1866
 
campaign speeches of significant members
 
of congress, the gubernatorial messages
 
calling for state consideration of the
 
proposed amendment, and the records of
 
state ratifying legislatures. The evide
 
nce dictated his finding that Congress
 
and the Country, in framing and ratifying
 
the amendment, did not understand that
 
Section one incorporated the first eight
 
Amendments, that in fact they had no
 
clear Understanding of the meaning of the
 
Amendment's trilogy, taken separately or
 
together. What was clear was only that
 
Negroes were to have the same civil righ
 
ts as white men and that the states could
 
not deny the rights undefined and un­
enumerated, of United States Citizenship.
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Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in a 1833 case
 
of Barron vs. Baltimore. forty years after the
 
Constitutional Convention, addressed the question of
 
incorporation by reiterating that the Federal Constitu­
13
 
tion did not apply to the states. So, based on the
 
court's actions before the fourteenth amendment, and the
 
historical record during the ratification process, the
 
incorporation theory as advanced by the Court in the last
 
ninety years is not grounded in the intent of the
 
framers. The question then is who is responsible to
 
bring about social change?
 
Justice William Brennan in a recent speech says this
 
about the Court's role in societal change.
 
Unabashed enshrinement of majority will,
 
would permit the imposition of a social
 
caste system or wholesale confiscation of
 
property so long as a majority of the
 
authorized legislative body, fairly
 
elected, is approved. Our Constitution
 
could not abide such a situation. It is
 
the very purpose of a constitution, and
 
particularly of the Bill of Rights, to
 
declare certain values transcendent,
 
beyond the reach of temporary political
 
majorities.^®
 
Justice Brennan believes that the court is the agent that
 
accomplishes these changes in society. Brennan sees the
 
court as providing the just remedies for these excesses
 
of the legislative process. The framers, though, did
 
intend those that come after them to look back and follow
 
the principles they enshrined in the Constitution. The
 
evidence that they believed this is the fact that the
 
Constitution was written down. The oath taken by the
 
President, members of Congress and the Supreme Court all
 
dictate that they uphold the Constitution. Ideally, all
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laws violating the spirit and the letter of the Constitu
 
tion would be nullified. These and others prove the
 
point that the Constitution was held above other law.
 
That is not to say that the Framers were not realists.
 
In fact, indirect constitutional recognition of slavery
 
was a concession by the framers because of political
 
necessity to get the Constitution ratified. If slavery
 
had not been allowed in the Constitution, there was a
 
good chance it may have not been ratified by the southern
 
states. But slavery had already been put on the road to
 
extinction with the passage of the Northwest Ordinance of
 
1787. This ordinance outlawed slavery in the territories
 
northwest of the Ohio River so that it would not spread.
 
So began the principle that slavery was the exception and
 
freedom the rule.
 
The principles of equality or the "standard maxim"
 
that Lincoln referred to have always been a part of this
 
regime. The idea that opponents of original intention
 
have the idea that the Constitution does not address
 
those kinds of issues, so principles perceived as not
 
existing in it need to be created in order to address
 
certain problems existing in society. If anything was
 
clear from all the sources at the time of the revolu
 
tion, it was the general sentiment that the people had
 
to create a new government that secured liberty from
 
tyranny, and that its principles would be enduring for
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ages to come. The Declaration of Independence is the
 
most obvious evidence of these facts.
 
in the next chapter, I will deal with the question
 
of what these principles were and if they really are
 
part of the Constitution.
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The American Constitution:
 
A Document Designed to Protect Principles of Equality
 
The principles enshrined in our Constitution came
 
from somewhere. It was Abraham Lincoln's contention
 
that the principles enshrined in the Constitution are
 
found in the Declaration of Independence. In one of his
 
debates with Stephen Douglas, Lincoln said:
 
Chief Justice Taney, in his opinion in
 
the Dred Scott case, admits that the
 
language of the Declaration is broad
 
enough to include the whole human family,
 
but he and Judge Douglas argue that the
 
authors of that instrument did not intend
 
to include Negroes, by the fact that they
 
did not at once actually place them on an
 
equality with the whites. Now this grave
 
argument comes to just nothing at all, by
 
the other fact, that they did not at
 
once, or ever aftejrwards, actually place
 
all white people on an equality with one
 
another. And this is the staple argument
 
of both the Chief Justice and the
 
Senators, for doing this obvious violence
 
to the plain unmistakable language of the
 
Declaration. I think the authors of that
 
notable instrument intended to include
 
all men, but they did not intend to decl
 
are all men are equal in all respects.
 
They did not mean to say all were equal
 
in color, size, intellect, moral develop
 
ment, or social capacity. They defined
 
with tolerable distinctness, in what
 
respect they did consider all men created
 
equal. Equal in 'certain inalienable
 
rights, among which are life, liberty,
 
and the pursuit of happiness.' This they
 
said and this they meant. They did not
 
mean to assert the obvious untruth, that
 
all were then actually enjoying that
 
equality, nor yet that they were able to
 
confer it immediately upon them. In
 
fact, they had no power to confer such a
 
17
 
boon. They meant simply to declare the
 
right, so that the enforcement of it
 
might follow as fast as circumstances
 
should permit. They meant to set up a
 
standard maxim for free society which
 
could be familiar to all, and revered by
 
all, constantly looked to, constantly
 
labored for, and even though never per
 
fectly attained, constantly approximated,
 
and thereby constantly spreading and
 
deepening its influence, and augmenting
 
the happiness and value of life to all
 
people of all colors everywhere.
 
The Constitution is an embodiment of these
 
principles, not only does it contain them but it provides
 
the organization to protect them. The Constitution was
 
designed to be the instrument or haven for all of the
 
natural rights possessed by its citizens. The
 
Constitution was to act as a servant of the people and
 
provide a means of securing them natural rights. The
 
framers of the Constitution clearly recognized that human
 
beings by their very nature were entitled to these
 
inalienable rights. These rights were entitled to the
 
people, according to Thomas Jefferson, by "the laws of
 
Nature and Nature's God."^^
 
The historical events that helped form the Decla
 
ration and Constitution was the national environment that
 
surrounded the revolution in the years just prior to it.
 
The influence of the enlightenment and a great religious
 
awakening helped shape the colonists' minds during the
 
middle part of the 1700s.
 
Enlightenment thinkers such as Locke and Montesquieu
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influenced to no small degree the framers of the Declara
 
tion and the Constitution. In fact, Thomas Jefferson
 
had this to say about the Declaration:
 
[The Declaration] was intended to be an
 
expression Of the American mind, and to
 
give to that expression the proper tone
 
and spirit called for by the occasion.
 
All its authority rests then on the
 
harmonizing of the sentiments of the day,
 
whether expressed in conversation,
 
letters, printed essays, or in the
 
elementary books of public right, as
 
Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, etc.^®
 
The enlightenment thinking was only one part of the
 
catalyst that helped form the Constitution. The other
 
was the general religious awakening of the time.
 
In the introduction of his book. The First Amend
 
ment. T. Daniel Shumate wrote:
 
Three phenomena affected all the colonies
 
during the 18th Century: The Great
 
Awakening, beginning in New England and
 
stimulating evangelization elsewhere;
 
Anglican efforts to establish episcopacy
 
in the colonies; and the Enlightenment.
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These two agents, the Enlightenment and the great reli
 
gious awakening caused a general backlash against
 
anything perceived by the colonists as tyranny. It is
 
also true that as the "experiment" with republicanism
 
persisted, it became evident to the Framers that a
 
government protecting the natural rights of its citizens
 
was a regime that would be obeyed and honored.
 
A civil society based on these fundamental prin­
19
 
ciples functioned better than societies that did not
 
acknowledge or respect thein. Although the Declaration
 
says that these truths are self-evident, and all men are
 
created equal, it took a long time to lay them out in a
 
written form, and even longer to create a government
 
that protected and respected them.
 
During the interim between the Declaration of
 
Independence and the creation of the Constitution, the
 
Articles of Confederation held the states together.
 
Many problems developed during the interim which could
 
not be addressed effectively through the Articles.
 
The inability of the Confederation to raise funds was one
 
of its most persistent problems. It was unable to pay
 
back foreign countries the money that were borrowed
 
during the Revolutionary War. The Confederation was also
 
unable to pay back its own citizens for debts incurred
 
during the war. In addition, the territories, which
 
should have rightfully been handed over to the states by
 
England after the war, were still in British hands. Not
 
only were the outposts and territories being held but
 
there was absolutely no power of retribution since no
 
troops could be enlisted.
 
Alexander Hamilton, in the Federalist Papers, wrote
 
that the main vice of the Confederation was "the
 
principle of legislation for states or governments, in
 
their corporate or collective capacities, as con­
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tradistinguished from the individuals of which they con
 
sist."20
 
He was arguing that the Confederation, in principle
 
was wrong, because it could not deal with a citizen
 
directly. Its only power extended to the state in which
 
he resided. The Confederation, therefore, could not
 
exercise any effective power but was restricted to mere
 
recommendations which the states could observe or disre
 
gard.
 
The issues of an ineffective Confederation, the
 
desire of the people to secure their natural rights, the
 
Enlightenment and religious revival of the 1700s, all
 
caused the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The dele
 
gates were faced with providing the nation with a fomn of
 
government that was energetic and representative to
 
secure liberty, yet powerful enough and responsive enough
 
to protect the citizens' natural rights.
 
Was the Constitution the product of a natural
 
rights philosophy? Undoubtedly it was. But arguments
 
have been proposed which claim that it could not possibly
 
have been so. We need not look too much farther than
 
Justice Brennan to find this argument against the natural
 
rights philosophy. He has said that "Typically, all
 
that can be gleaned is that the framers themselves did
 
not agree about the application or meaning of particular
 
constitutional provisions, and hid their differences in
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cloaks of generality." And, "Each generation has the
 
choice to overrule or add to the fundamental principles
 
enunciated by the framers; the Constitution can be amend
 
ed or it can be ignored.
 
But the facts are that even our founding fathers
 
did not even debate as to the fundamental principle
 
undergirding our Constitution. Thomas Jefferson, the
 
architect of our Declaration of Independence, which en
 
shrined natural rights at the beginning of that document
 
to the standard any legitimate government should be de
 
signed to protect, was in wholehearted agreement with
 
the principles enunciated in the Constitution. When
 
Madison sent a draft of the Constitution to him while an
 
ambassador to France, he agreed with Madison that, "If
 
they approve the proposed convention in all its parts, I
 
shall concur in it cheerfully,"^2
 
John Jay in Federalist Paper No. 2 makes it clear
 
that his assumption is that the Constitution rests
 
squarely on the principle of natural rights and a
 
limited government to protect those rights when he wrote.
 
Nothing is more certain than the indis
 
pensable necessity of government, and it
 
is equally undeniable that whenever and
 
however it is instituted, the people
 
must cede to it some of their natural
 
rights in order to vest it with requi
 
site powers.
 
In fact, in arguing against adding a Bill of
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Rights, Alexander Hamilton says.
 
For why declare that things shall not be
 
done which there is no power to do? The
 
truth is, after all the declarations we
 
have heard, that the Constitution is it
 
self, in every rational sense and every

useful purpose> a Bill of Rights.^4
 
What Hamilton was saying in essence is that the
 
Constitution protected the public's natural rights in
 
two significant ways. One way was by actually writing
 
into the body of the Constitution fundamental principles
 
or natural rights that could never be violated such as
 
the establishment of the writ of habeas corpus, the prohi
 
bition of ex-post-facto laws and of titles of nobility.
 
The other way it protected the citizens• natural
 
rights was by never addressing the subject of certain
 
natural rights, such as freedom of the press. For
 
example, nowhere in the body of the Constitution is there
 
any language expressly securing the freedom of religion.
 
Because of the principle of a limited government, which
 
meant that the people ceded to government only certain
 
natural rights as its responsibility, there was no need
 
to write into the Constitution a freedom of religion
 
clause since that right was never given to it to protect.
 
There are those who could argue that the Constitution
 
when drafted the summer of 1787 was not in its complete
 
form because later a Bill of Rights was added. But they
 
fail to bring up the point that one of the strongest
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reasons for attaching the Bill of Rights was not to
 
protect freedom as much as that it was used by the
 
Federalists to defuse an attempt by the Antifederalists
 
to discredit the constitution. James Madison took the
 
lead in drafting the bill so that he could defuse the
 
AntiFederalists' attack, so he could provide the groundwork
 
for a Bill of Rights if there was to be one.
 
Not only did our founding fathers see that the
 
Constitution embodied natural rights, it is also clear
 
that Abraham Lincoln clearly saw that fact also. While
 
debating Stephen Douglas, Lincoln made this point about
 
natural rights:
 
All honor to Jefferson-—to the man who,
 
in the concrete pressure of a struggle
 
for national independence by a single
 
people, had the coolness, forecast and
 
capacity to introduce into a merely
 
revolutionary document, an abstract
 
truth, applicable to all men and all times
 
and so to embalm it there, that today and
 
in all coming days it shall be a rebuke
 
and stumbling block to the very harbinger
 
of reappearing tyranny and oppression. That
 
abstract or universal principle is that
 
all men are created equal.
 
That principle, of course, is the principle of equality
 
and natural rights. Lincoln saw our Constitution as an
 
instrument to secure those natural rights. He knew that
 
without this principle, this basis, our Constitution
 
could be construed as having any meaning the judiciary
 
may want. In fact, at the time Lincoln was debating
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Douglas, the effects of the Dred Scott case were increas
 
ing the tension between the North and the South.
 
Lincoln fought the Civil War, to restore the foundation
 
of the Constitution—the Declaration of Independence.
 
But at the same time another philosophy called positivism
 
gained popular appeal.
 
Stephen Douglas' doctrine of popular sovereignty
 
is a qlassic example of the positivistic philosophy.
 
Was slavery to be introduced into the territories, or was
 
it to be kept out? According to the doctrine of popular
 
sovereignty, the people had to decide the issue. The
 
decision to allow slavery into the territories was not
 
based on the fundamental principle of equality and the
 
natural rights of every human being but on what society
 
determined was right or wrong. So positivism is the
 
practical approach to a problem based on human will
 
rather than on a fundamental principle.
 
William Brennan's philosophy is not far removed
 
from Stephen Douglas•. Although Stephen Douglas fought
 
for the principle of majority rule and Justice Brennan
 
for personal rights based on human principles, they each
 
argued, one by majority rule and the other by Judicial
 
rule, that "human will" at any particular time in
 
history determines what policy government should follow.
 
In summary, it can be seen that our founding fathers,
 
as well as others down through the ages including Abraham
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Lincoln, perceived that our Constitution rested on the
 
fundamental principles enshrined in the Declaration of
 
Independence. These principles were known as Natural
 
Rights. But soon after the Civil War, the new philosophy
 
of positivism became popular and that has proved to have
 
an enduring quality up to and including today.
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The Transformation of the American Constitution
 
Through the Fourteenth Amendment
 
Nowhere can the change in our Constitution be seen
 
more clearly than in the use of the 14th Amendment. Was
 
it to be used, as some say, to incorporate the Bill of
 
Rights and apply them to the states? There are, of
 
course, arguments presented by both sides wishing to
 
prove their thesis. For example, Michael Keith Curtis in
 
his book. No State Shall Abridge, sets forth his arguments
 
for the incorporation theory, while Raoul Berger in his
 
book Government bv the Judiciarv. takes the opposite
 
side, arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was not
 
supposed to be incorporated to the States. What was the
 
amendment designed to do? Without a doubt, it was de
 
signed to recognize the black man's inalienable right of
 
equality, and to secure his natural rights of life,
 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
 
To understand whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment
 
was supposed to incorporate the Bill of Rights to the
 
States, it is important to understand that period of
 
time. It is an unquestionable fact that the Constitution
 
was an instrument that was meant to secure natural
 
rights. It is also true that it assumed slavery existed,
 
and made references to that institution. Also, it is
 
clear that the men who framed the Constitution were well
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aware of the incongruency of these two doctrines. These
 
men, the Framers as Lincoln asserted, did not leave the
 
institution of slavery to itself. By an act of Congress
 
they made its extension into illegal territories. It
 
is also clear that because of issues like slavery and
 
mistrust of a national government, the Federal Government
 
was created with substantial limits, while the state
 
governments retained a considerable degree of power.
 
Over the next decades the debate over whether or not
 
slavery should be allowed into the territories became
 
more and more an issue. This issue of whether or not to
 
allow slavery into the territories soon raised the
 
question of states rights and ultimately climaxed in the
 
Lincoln-Douglas debates. Lincoln held that the principles
 
enshrined in the Declaration of Independence, of equality
 
was of more fundamental importance then that of Popular
 
sovereignty. Adding to these facts was the Supreme
 
courts offensive attempt to define the black man as a
 
piece of property. With these important historical
 
facts in mind the question of what was the Fourteenth
 
Amendment designed to become was somewhat easier to
 
answer. Raoul Berger, in his book Government bv Judiciary,
 
points out numerous quotations by those debating the
 
amendment that make it clear that they were discussing
 
the constitutionalizing of natural rights for all people,
 
and specifically of the black man. Berger cites person
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after person, who during the debates surrounding the
 
ratification to the Amendment, state that they do not see
 
the Amendment incorporating the Bill of Rights. For
 
example, George R. Latham of West Virginia stated that:
 
"the civil rights bill which is now a law covers exactly
 
the same ground as this amendment ^^ In the first
 
section Berger points out in other examples the Framers
 
were clear that it was natural rights they were talking
 
about. Some of the examples stated were, "the enumerated
 
rights I stated in the (Civil Rights) bill were the
 
fundamental rights of citizenship,"27 said Martin Thayer
 
of Pennsylvania.
 
Are these fundamental rights talked about by Martin
 
Thayer the same as the natural rights in the Declaration
 
of Independence? Representative Wilson asked the same
 
question, and in his description, he seems to come to
 
that conclusion:
 
What do these terms mean? Do they mean
 
that in all things, civil, social, 
political, all citizens, without dis 
tinction of race or color, shall be 
equal? By ho means can they be so
 
construed, nor do they mean that all
 
citizens shall sit on juries, or that
 
their children shall attend the same
 
schools. These are not civil rights and
 
immunities. Well, what is the meaning?
 
What are Civil Rights? I understand
 
civil rights do be simply the absolute
 
rights of individuals, such as the right
 
of personal security/ the right of
 
personal liberty, and the right to
 
acquire and enjoy property. The use of
 
these words are closely related to the
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 exact words used in the Declaration of
 
Independence describing natural rights.
 
Michael Curtis, on the other hand, views the debates
 
in a different way. In his book. No State Shall Abridge,
 
he takes a different perspective on the incorporation
 
theory. He maintains that James Madison had the
 
incorporation theory in mind when he purposed the Bill of
 
Rights. Curtis !explains that Madison was won over by
 
Jefferson to believe that with a Bill of Rights attached
 
to the Constitution the citizens of the United States
 
would establish a bulwark against state and federal
 
encroachment on their fundamental rights. Madison, was
 
actually conceeding a point to the states. He, being a
 
realist, knew that without a Bill of Rights the states
 
would probably not ratify the Constitution because of
 
their fear of "the new federal government. In fact
 
Curtis, concedes I that the evidence seems to indicate
 
that incorporation was not the desired end, but that the
 
fact of the matter is different because of new facts he
 
1 ■ ■ 
has uncovered. He asserts that the republicans especially
 
Representative Bingham, who authored the Fourteenth
 
Amendment, viewed:it as an incorporation tool. But time
 
after time the record indicates that the sentiment was
 
clearly the opposite. For example, M. Russell Thayer of
 
Pennsylvania said, 
I 
...to avoid any misapprehension as to 
what the fundamental rights of 
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citizenship are, they are stated in the
 
bill. The same section goes on to define
 
what were the civil rights and immunities
 
which are to be protected by the bill.
 
When those civil rights, which are first
 
referred to in general terms (that is,
 
civil rights and immunities) are subse
 
quently ; enumerated, that enumeration
 
precludes any possibility that the
 
general words which have been used can be
 
extended beyond the particular which
 
have been enumerated. That the bill was
 
for the protection of the fundamental
 
rights of citizenship and nothing else."
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Also James Patterson of New Hampshire, noted;
 
I am opposed, to any law discriminating
 
against [blacks] in the security of life,
 
liberty, 'property and the proceeds of
 
their labor. These civil rights all
 
should enjoy. Beyond this I am not
 
prepared to go, and those pretended
 
friends who urge political and social
 
equality are the worst enemies of the
 
colored race.^^
 
The framers !were talking about equality in natural
 
rights and that is where they stopped. These facts are
 
also supported by history. The Civil War had just ended
 
and even the North was perplexed at its dilemma of
 
somehow incorporating the Negroes into society. The
 
North, who supposedly treated Negroes as equal had
 
segregation laws in effect and only a two states allowed
 
them to vote. According to Roscoe Conkling,
 
The northern states, most of them, do
 
not permit Negroes to vote. Some of them
 
repeatedly and lately pronounced against
 
it. Therefore, even if it were defensible
 
as a principle for the Central Govern
 
ment to absorb by Amendment the power to
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control the action of the states in
 
such a matter, would it not be futile to
 
ask three-quarters of the States to do
 
for themselves and others, by ratifying
 
such an Amendment, the very thing most of
 
them have already refused to do in their
 
own cases?"^^
 
From these examples and others it can be seen that
 
the scope of the amendment was narrow in its application.
 
It extended to -the ex-slaves the natural rights of all
 
men but did not go any further. The issue of whether the
 
bill of Rights should be incorporated by the amendment
 
as not included in its meaning. The goal and purpose of
 
the Constitution of 1787 was to establish equality, but
 
the Fourteenth amendment, which continued to expand
 
equality, was not supposed to be used by the court to
 
incorporate the Bill of Rights and apply them to the
 
states. Section I of the fourteenth amendment it says:
 
All persons born or Naturalized in the
 
United States, and subject to the
 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
 
the United States, and subject to the
 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
 
United States and of the State wherein
 
they reside. No state shall make or
 
enforce any law which shall abridge the
 
privileges or immunities of citizens of
 
the United States. Nor shall any state
 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or
 
property, without due process of law;
 
nor any <Jeny to any person within its
 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the
 
laws.
 
■| 
It is fairly certain that the Framers' view on what 
equal protection of the laws meant was that the Negro's 
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 natural rights were included but his political rights
 
were not. If Negro suffrage had been included another
 
amendment would not have been needed. Senator Hendrick,
 
an Indiana Democrat:
 
To recognize the Civil rights of the
 
colored people as equal to the Civil
 
rights of the white people, I understand
 
to be as far as Senators desire to go;
 
in the language of the Senator from
 
Massachusetts (Sumner) to place all men
 
upon an equality before the law, and
 
that is ; proposed in regard to their
 
civil rights, (natural rights).
 
James W. Patterson of New Hampshire was "opposed to
 
any law discriminating against (blacks) in the security
 
and protection of life, liberty, person and property,
 
beyond this I am no prepared to go', explicitly reject
 
ing political and social equality. It is true that
 
the amendment was meant to do away with the black codes
 
that had been legislated in the States. But to say that
 
the amendment was designed to redefine the relationship
 
between the National government and the State government
 
would be wrong. The emphasis was to remedy and extend
 
the original constitutiori's privileges and immunities to
 
all of the citizens not just the white man. It is
 
also clear that the framers did not see the amendment as
 
a way for congress to legislate its will over the
 
states. In fact it was the opposite they felt that the
 
existence of the states with power for domestic and
 
local government was essential to the working of
 
i
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government. As I mentioned earlier, in Barren v.
 
!
 
Baltimore. Chief Justice Marshall says after a discussion
 
of nation-state relations, "If these propositions be
 
correct, the fifth amendment must be understood as
 
restraining the power of the general government, not as
 
applicable to the States." And he continues.
 
It is universally understood, it is a
 
part of the history of the day, that the
 
great revolution which established the
 
constitution of the United States was not
 
effected without immense opposition.
 
Serious fears were extensively enter
 
tained that those powers which the
 
patriot states men who then watched over
 
the interests of our Country, deemed
 
essential to Union, and to the attainment
 
of those invaluable objects for which the
 
Union sought, might be exercised in a
 
manner daingerous to liberty. In almost
 
every convention by which the constitution
 
was adoptied, amendments to guard against
 
the abuse of power were recommended.
 
These amendments demanded security
 
against the apprehended encroachments of
 
the general government not against those
 
of the local governments.^^
 
The Framers of the Fourteenth amendment understood
 
that the meaning of the amendment applies to states in a
 
I
 
very narrow way.- It was not to confer or regulate
 
rights, but to| require that whatever rights and
 
I
 
obligations were imposed by the states, those should be
 
without distinction based on race. This did not in any
 
way refute or overrule Barron. He did not allow the Bill
 
of Rights to be placed on the States. The amendment
 
extended the states obligation to equal protection of
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 natural rights to Negroes. In view of the limited
 
objectives of sepuring life, liberty and the pursuit of
 
happiness or natural rights to Negroes, how has the
 
amendment undergone such change? They did not intend
 
the amendment to become such a broad, general catch-all.
 
Was it wrong that the amendment did not provide full
 
equality? Probably so but it was as far as they could go
 
politically at that period of history.
 
In summing up, Berger who holds the perspective that
 
the Fourteenth Amendment was a step toward equality but
 
not full equality is probably the closest to the truth.
 
There are too many clear facts, such as the clear records
 
of the debate, the passage of an additional amendment,
 
i , ■ ■ 
the situation on' inequality in the northern state, the
 
Supreme Court readings prior to the amendment that make
 
arguments such as Curtis•; difficult to defend. Curtis
 
does however, make arguments like:
 
The idea that the constitution protected
 
fundamental liberties of citizens against
 
state action was accepted by republicans
 
of all pplitical persuasion. Its most
 
ardent exponent was John Bingham, a
 
conservative to centrist republican.
 
Bingham'Si greatest problem in getting the
 
final draft of his proposal for a
 
Fourteenth Amendment accepted was not
 
that it departed from what Republicans
 
thought appropriate. It was that many
 
republicans had so convinced themselves
 
of the correctness of their constitu
 
tional views that they considered the
 
Fourteenth Amendment superfluous. They
 
thought blacks were already citizens;
 
that States were already prohibited from
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 depriving free persons of due process;
 
that alli the privileges or immunities or
 
rights of American Citizens protected
 
them throughout the nation, even in the
 
South.36
 
Even though a majority of the republicans thought
 
that, the final effect of the Fourteenth Amendment was not
 
supposed to be incorporation. Just a few years later in
 
1875 a Constitutional Amendment was brought forward,
 
called the Elaine Amendment proposing aid to religion.
 
It was defeated by the Senate never making it to the state
 
legislators for ratification. Why would the House have
 
asked for a Constitutional Amendment to aid religion if
 
the Fourteenth Amendment had been meant to incorporate
 
the Bill of Rights? The only answer can be that it did
 
not mean for it to incorporate the Bill of Rights. The
 
framers of the amendment went as far as they could go.
 
They moved toward the standard maxim but did not attain
 
it. Were they naive to think that with such a narrow
 
construction of !the amendment they could solve the
 
problem of inequality? On the basis of recent Supreme
 
Court rulings it ;would seem so. It is evident that the
 
failure of the Congress to legislate effectively has
 
caused the Supreme Court to legislate unilaterally its
 
own will. By looking at the transformation of the
 
amendment over the last 100 years, it can be seen how
 
this has occurred.
 
The Civil Rights Cases of 1883 hinged on the question
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 of whether or not Congress could pass legislation giving
 
any person the full and equal enjoyment of accoitonodation,
 
advantages, facilities, and privileges, based on Section
 
I and Section V of the amendment. The court held that:
 
Until some state law has been passed, or
 
some state action through its officers or
 
agents has been taken, adverse to the
 
rights of citizens sought to be protected
 
by the amendment, no legislation of the
 
United states under said amendment, nor
 
any proceeding under such legislation, 
can be called into activity, for the 
prohibitions of the amendment are 
against state laws and acts done under
 
state authority.
 
Justice Bradley goes on to state that:
 
The wrongful act of an individual,
 
unsupported by any such authority, is
 
simply a private wrong, or an crime of
 
that individual; an invasion of the
 
rights of; the injured party, it is true,
 
whether they affect his person, his
 
property, i or his reputation, but if not
 
sanctioned in some way by the state, or
 
not done; under state authority, his
 
rights remain in full force, any may
 
presumably be indicated by resort to the
 
laws of the state for redress.
 
Also in an earlier case, called the Slaughterhouse
 
Casaes. it was held that the amendment was not intended
 
to extend to legislation granting exclusive franchises
 
within the state of Louisiana. To quote Justice Miller:
 
We do not see in those amendments
 
(Thirteenth and Fourteenth) any purpose
 
to destroy the main features of the
 
general system. Under the pressure of
 
all the excited feeling growing out of
 
the war, our statesman still believe
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that the: existence of the states with
 
powers for domestic and local government,
 
including the regulation of civil rights,
 
the rights of person and of property,
 
was essential to the perfect working of
 
our complex form of government, though
 
they have thought proper to impose addi
 
tional limitations on the states, and to
 
confer additional power on that of the
 
nation.
 
In these two cases, one starts to see that the
 
limited, narrow construction of the amendment which the
 
framers intended produced results that were not altogether
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equitable. But again the issue was two-fold. Would the
 
legislative branch do what it needed to do by passing
 
legislation to shore up the amendment's true meaning, or
 
would it abdicate it rightful obligation and allow the
 
court to create social change?
 
Because the states were seen as the final authority
 
over its own citizens, the inequality of their laws were
 
not overruled. This can be seen even better in Plessv v.
 
Ferguson, which established the doctrine of separate but
 
equal. In Plessv; Justice Brown wrote.
 
The object of the Amendment was
 
undoubtedly to enforce the absolute
 
equality of the two races before the law,
 
but, in the nature of things, it could
 
not have been intended to abolish dis
 
tinctions based upon color, or to en
 
force social, as distinguished from
 
political, equality, or a commingling of
 
the two races upon terms unsatisfactory
 
to either.
 
He went on to list the circumstances permitting and
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 even requiring the separation of the races, [such as
 
public facilities, schools, marriage and theaters]. "If
 
one race is inferior to the other socially, the constitu
 
tion of the United States cannot put them upon the same
 
plane. These cases to be sure, were not all the court
 
had to say about the amendment. In an opinion given in
 
1880 a black man, Strauder, sought to have his murder
 
trial removed to a federal court since West Virginia law
 
did not permit negroes to be eligible for service on
 
petit juries. The Supreme Court sustained Strauder's
 
request and, through Justice Strong said;
 
The words of the amendment contain a
 
necessary implication of a positive
 
immunity or right, most valuable to the
 
colored race, the right to exemption
 
from unfriendly legislation against them
 
distinctly as colored - exemption from
 
legal distinctions, implying inferiority
 
in civil society, lessening security of
 
their enjoyment of the rights which
 
others enjoy, and discriminations which
 
are steps towards reducing them to the
 
condition of a subject race. The very
 
fact that colored people are singled out
 
and expressly denied by statute all right
 
to participate in the administration of
 
the law, as jurors, because of their
 
color, though they are citizens, and may
 
be in other respects fully qualified, is
 
practically a brand upon them, affixed by
 
the law, an assertion of their inferiority,
 
and a stimulant to that race prejudice
 
which is an impediment to securing to
 
individuals of that race that equal
 
justice which the law aims to secure to
 
all others.
 
So, while opinions like Strauder's did afford equal
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protection to some, most, like Plessv. were so narrow
 
that the Negro race suffered discrimination. The extent
 
of the amendment's application was not broad enough to
 
give its equal protection of laws clause its needed, full
 
application which should have been what Justice Harlan's
 
dissent, in Plessv v. Ferguson, stated: "Our constitution
 
is color-blind and neither knows or tolerates classes
 
among citizens." Justice Harlan went on to echo some
 
fairly prophetic words about what this ruling would
 
produce.
 
The present decision, it may well be
 
apprehended, will not only stimulate ag
 
gressions, more or less brutal and irri
 
tating, upon the admitted rights of
 
colored citizens, but will encourage the
 
belief that it is possible, by means of
 
state enactments, to defeat the beneficent
 
purposes which the people of the United
 
States had in view when they adopted the
 
recent amendments of the constitution,
 
(13,14,15th amendments) by one of which
 
the blacks of this country were made
 
citizens of the Unites States and the
 
states in which they respectively reside,
 
and whose privileges and immunities, as
 
citizens, the states are forbidden to
 
abridge. Sixty million of whites are in
 
ho danger from the presence here of eight
 
million of blacks. The destines of the
 
two races, in this country, are
 
indissolvably linked together, and the
 
interests of both require that the common
 
government of all shall not permit the
 
seeds of race hate to be planted under
 
the sanction of law. What can more cer
 
tainly arouse race hate, what more
 
certainly create and perpetuate a feeling
 
of distrust between these races, than state
 
enactments which, in fact, proceed on the
 
ground that colored citizens are so
 
inferior and degraded that they cannot be
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allowed to sit in piiblic. Coaches
 
occupied by white citizens? That as all
 
will admit, is the real meaning of such
 
legislation as was enacted in Louisiana.
 
For the next 58 years the Negro was discriminated
 
against under the protection of law. Not until the 1954
 
case of Brown v. Board of Education of Tooeka was there
 
a remedy under law. But although Brown v. Board is said
 
to have rendered a correct conclusion to the case, the
 
basis on which the conclusion rests, is questionable.
 
According to Berger, Alexander Bickel, who had the
 
job of compiling the legislative history of the amendment,
 
helps us to see why the Court rested its conclusion on
 
sociological evidence and not law. Bickel delivered his
 
memorandum to Justice Frankfurter, for whom he was doing
 
the research for. It stated:
 
It is impossible to conclude that the
 
39th Congress intended that segregation
 
be abolished;impossible also to conclude
 
that they foresaw it might be, under the
 
language they were adopting. There is
 
no evidence what ever showing that for
 
its sponsors (framers) the civil rights
 
formula had anything to do with un-^
 
segregated schools.
 
Because Of this kind of analysis. Chief Justice Warren
 
based the conclusions of the Court on the unsettled,
 
changing ground of social science.
 
Brown V. Board was evidence of a court taking the
 
law into its own hands. Its supra-legislative act of
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declaring desegregation illegal under the constitution,
 
based on nothing other than sociological evidence, was a
 
mistake.
 
There seems to be substantive evidence that the
 
natural implications of the Natural Rights law supplies a
 
much firmer basis of law. These implications based on
 
the fact that all men are created equal and are endowed
 
with life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, would
 
mean people could live where they pleased, go to school
 
where they pleased, based not on color or race but
 
intelligence, ambition and content of their character.
 
The conclusions that can be drawn from the
 
transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment are these.
 
First, the underling principles of the amendment were
 
exactly the same ones that were used in the constitution;
 
the principles of equality and natural rights. But
 
because of the politically difficult times following the
 
Civil War, the interpretation of the amendment by the
 
court did not afford equal protection to black men.
 
Instead of expanding the amendment•s meaning based on
 
the principles of equality nothing was done for over a
 
half a century, so the problem of inequality persisted
 
until the Court ruled in Brown v. Board that inequality
 
would not be tolerated legally. But the process of
 
change had shifted in a bold way. It was not the
 
legislative branch that had lead the way as the
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constitution envisioned, and, secondly, the court had
 
gained a significant say in social change in a supra-

legislative capacity. Thirdly the principles on which
 
equality stood had subtly changed. It was no longer
 
based on certain inalienable rights but on societal,
 
scientific evidences, or on human will.
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The Transformation Of The First Amendment
 
Through The Fourteenth Amendment
 
Looking at the First Amendment, its meaning was
 
changed in an innocent enough way. The adoption of the
 
14th Amendment paved the way for the incorporation of
 
the First Amendment. The chief purpose of the 14th
 
Amendment, was to insure the freedom of the Negroes and
 
protect their proper status as citizens of the United
 
States. It is true to say that, up to and including
 
today, it has been used for many other purposes besides
 
this. In fact, in Marnell's words, "for the first 70
 
years of its history, the 14th Amendment was not cited,
 
in any case directly concerned with a religious issue as
 
such a guarantee. But as the due process clause of
 
the 14th Amendment was used selectively to incorporate
 
various parts of the Bill of Rights, the time finally
 
came when the Establishment Clause was also incorporated.
 
The use of the due process clause to incorporate the
 
free exercise clause of the First Amendment was alluded
 
to in a Supreme Court case called Hamilton v. Regents of
 
the Universitv of California. It was mentioned in the
 
obiter dictum only, but the process was already a long
 
way down the road toward its incorporation. The Hamilton
 
case hinged on the question of whether a Student who had
 
religious scruples against bearing arms could be
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compelled, under penalty of expulsion, to take military
 
drill in the University of California. The Supreme
 
Court ruled that while the religious beliefs of Hamilton
 
were protected by due process of law, he was not being
 
compelled to attend the University and could assert no
 
constitutional right to do so without complying with the
 
State's requirement of military training. With the
 
groundwork now set to address religious issues, the
 
Supreme Court was asked to address problems having to do
 
with the Establishment Clause.
 
In 1947, a case was brought before the Supreme Court
 
called Everson v. Board of Education of Township of
 
Ewing. The case involved a New Jersey statute that
 
allowed local school districts to make rules and
 
contracts for the transportation of children to and from
 
schools. The township of Ewing authorized reimbursement
 
to parents of money they had spent for bus transportation
 
of their children on regular buses operated by the
 
public transportation system. Part of this payment was
 
to parents, who had sent their children to a Catholic
 
parochial school.
 
Everson brought a suit against the board challenging
 
the right of the board to reimburse parents of parochial
 
school students, contending that the statute violated
 
the Constitution, specifically the Establishment of reli
 
gion Clause. The court, in a five to four decision,
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concluded that the township had not violated the Estab
 
lishment Clause because, as Justice Black said:
 
We must be careful in protecting the
 
citizens of New Jersey against State-est
 
ablishment churches to be sure that we do
 
not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey
 
from extending its general state law
 
benefits to all its citizens without
 
regard to their religious belief.^®
 
His argument hinged on the fact that it provided
 
benefit to the individual and not the State. With this
 
decision, two things became particularly clear. First,
 
Justice Black said that the First Amendment meant at
 
least this: neither State nor Federal Government can set
 
up a church. Because of the incorporation of the First
 
Amendment by the Fourteenth Amendment, it was possible
 
to declare the First Amendment open to interpretation by
 
the Court. Secondly, the decision set forth the
 
requirements of the Establishment Clause which Justice
 
Black said:
 
The Federal Government cannot pass laws
 
which aid one religion, aid all reli
 
gions, or prefer one religion over an
 
other. Neither can force nor influence a
 
person to go to or to remain away from
 
church against his will or force him to
 
profess a belief or disbelief in any
 
religion. No person can be punished for
 
entertaining or professing religious
 
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
 
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in
 
any amount, large or small, can be levied
 
to support any religious activities or
 
institutions, whatever they may be
 
called, or whatever form they may adopt
 
to teach or practice religion. Neither a
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state nor the Federal Government can,
 
openly or secretly, par ticipate in the
 
affairs of any religious organizations or
 
groups or vice-versa. In the words of
 
Jefferson,the clause against establishment
 
of religion by law was intended to erect
 
a wall of separation between Church and
 
State.
 
The case opened the doors for numerous other cases
 
which changed the meaning and application of the First
 
Amendment. There are two cases that dealt with the
 
concept of released time and dismissed time; the practice
 
of conducting religious instruction within the school
 
building. In a case called McCollum v. Board of
 
Education of Champaign, the question arose whether or not
 
religious instruction could be given to a student while
 
in a public classroom.
 
Justice Black outlined the case and summarized the
 
majority opinion this way:
 
This beyond all question is a utilization
 
of the tax-established and tax-supp
 
orted public school system to aid reli
 
gious groups and to spread their faith.
 
And it falls squarely under the ban of
 
the First Amendment (made applicable to
 
the States by the i4th Amendment) as we
 
interpreted it in Everson v. Board of
 
Education.
 
Black then turned to the respondent's argument,
 
which rested on two premises: that the First Amendment
 
was intended to forbid only governmental preference for
 
one religion over another and not governmental assistance
 
for all religions, and that the Fourteenth Amendment did
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not make the establishment of religion clause of the
 
First Amendment applicable to the States. He rejected
 
both arguments. After stating that no hostility to
 
religion was intended in his opinion, he concluded, "The
 
First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion
 
and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims
 
free from the other within their respective spheres.
 
Justice Reed, dissenting in the case, found himself
 
unable to determine precisely what released time aspect
 
of the Champaign plan was unconstitutional. He said:
 
I conclude that their [courts] teachings
 
are that any use of a pupil's school
 
time, whether the use is on or off the
 
school grounds, with the necessary school
 
regulations to facilitate attendance,
 
falls under this ban . .
 
He then turned to the history of the First Amendment and
 
found that Thomas Jefferson, as rector of the University
 
of Virginia for which Madison was one of the visitors,
 
had established a system of released time at the
 
university. He cited the aid that religion receives
 
from the State in the form of no tax exemption. He gave
 
the example of chaplains who invoke the divine blessing
 
of Congress at each daily meeting, the commissioned
 
chaplains in the armed forces, the compulsory attendance
 
at church services at West Point and Annapolis. He
 
concluded by saying:
 
The prohibition of enactments respecting
 
the establishment of religion does not
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bar every friendly gesture between church
 
and state. It is not an absolute gesture
 
between church and state. It is not an
 
absolute prohibition against every
 
conceivable situation where the two may
 
work together, any more than the other
 
provision of the First Amendment—free
 
speech, free press are absolutes . . .
 
This court cannot be too cautious in
 
upsetting practices embedded in our
 
society by many years of experience. A
 
state is entitled to have great leeway in
 
its legislation when dealing with the
 
important social problems of its popu
 
lation. A definite violation of legisla
 
tive limits must be established. The
 
Constitution should not be stretched to
 
forbid national customs in the way courts
 
act to reach arrangements to avoid
 
federal taxation. Devotion to the great
 
principle of religious liberty should not
 
lead us into a rigid interpretation of
 
the constitutional guarantee that conflicts
 
with accepted habits of our people. This
 
is an instance where, for me, the history
 
of past practices is determinative of the
 
meaning of a constitiatiohal clause, not a
 
decorous introllection to the study of
 
its text. The judgment should be
 
affirmed.
 
In this ruling, as in Everson. the Court had now
 
established a precedent that subjected the First
 
Amendment, as it related to the States, to its litmus
 
test.
 
Secondly, it had taken a new view, a non-historical
 
view of the First Amendment's objective. This view
 
results in a much broader interpretation of the
 
Establishment Clause. It view contends that the clause
 
prohibits any governmental support of religion. Histor
 
ically is definitely skewed. It not only ignores the
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 overwhelming social sentiment of this time but also
 
neglects, without comment, the origin of the First
 
Amendment. The founders' opinion, was that the Amendment
 
prohibited a national church and was not willing to
 
address State issues about religion.
 
Four years later, Zorack v. Clauson came up for
 
review by the court, and it modified its stand on released
 
time. Justice Douglas distinguished Zorach from McCollum
 
by emphasizing the differences between the two plans.
 
In McCollum. the students used government facilities
 
while receiving religious instruction; in Zorach, they
 
did not. In McCollum. the state's compulsory school
 
attendance machinery was used to make students go to
 
religion classes, but in Zorach, students could remain
 
at school in study hall.
 
But most importantly. Justice Douglas said that the
 
establishment prohibition did not preclude government
 
from accommodating the interest of religion. His opinion
 
was:
 
. . . we find no constitutional require
 
ment which makes it necessary for
 
government to be hostile to religion and
 
to throw its weight against efforts to
 
widen the effective scope of religious
 
influence that would be preferring those
 
who believe in no religion over those who
 
do believe. We are a religious people
 
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme

Being.52
 
The decision affirmed the New York statute as
 
50
 
constitutional.
 
Within a decade, two cases appeared before the
 
Supreme Court dealing with prayer. The first case was
 
the Regents Praver case. The New York State Board of
 
Regents allowed schools to open their days with a recital
 
of a prayer. In a six-to-one opinion, the Supreme Court
 
held the statute to be unconstitutional on the fact that
 
the Establishment Clause was violated because the prayer
 
was composed by government officials. Justice Black
 
stated that:
 
... when the power, prestige, and
 
financial support of government is
 
placed behind a particular religious
 
belief, the indirect coercive pressure
 
upon religious minorities to conform to
 
the prevailing officially approved
 
religion is plain.^^
 
Justice Stewart filed the only dissenting opinion,
 
which followed a pattern of dissent in bases-cited facts
 
such as references to the Deity in the National Anthem
 
and the Pledge pf Allegiance, the National Day of
 
Prayer, chaplains in the service and in penal institu
 
tions, and finally in the Declaration of Independence.
 
In the Murrav v. Curlett. Bible reading in public
 
schools was also found uncpnstitutional. Justice Clark
 
delivered the majcrity ppinicn maintaining that the
 
reading pf the Bible and recitatipn pf the Lprd's Prayer
 
were religipus exercises prescribed as classroom
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activities, and concluded it was a violation of the
 
Establishment Clause. Justice Steward again rendered
 
the dissenting opinion.
 
This brought up two points which up until that time
 
had not been expressed.
 
As a matter of history, the First
 
Amendment was adopted solely as a
 
limitation upon the newly created national
 
government. The events leading to its
 
adoption strongly suggest that the
 
Establishment Clause was primarily an
 
attempt to insure that Congress not only
 
would be powerless to establish a national
 
Church, but would also be unable to
 
interfere with existing State estab
 
lishments. Each State was left free to
 
go its own way and pursue its own policy
 
with respect to religion. I accept,
 
too, the preposition that the 14th
 
Amendment has somehow absorbed the Estab
 
lishment Clause, although it is not
 
without irony that a constitutional
 
provision evidently designed to leave the
 
states free to go their own way should
 
not have become a restriction upon their
 
autonomy.
 
He concluded with his second point:
 
For a compulsory state educational
 
system so structures a child's life [so]
 
that if religious exercises are held to
 
be an impermissible activity in schools,
 
religion is placed at an artificial and
 
state-created disadvantage. And a
 
refusal to permit religious exercises
 
thus is seen, not as the realization of
 
state neutrality but rather as the estab
 
lishment of a religion of secularism or
 
at the least, as a government support of
 
the beliefs of those who think that reli
 
gious exercises would be conducted only
 
in private.
 
These two points practically and constitutionally
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were consistent with the founding fathers' intentions.
 
The court, as it has done to the 14th Amendment, changed
 
the First Amendment's meaning to fit their particular
 
bias. William Marnell, in his book The First Amendment,
 
wrote;
 
The First Amendment meant only a fraction
 
of that [what it means today] when it
 
was adopted. States did have established
 
churches then; they did pass laws to
 
aid one religion and to show preference
 
for one religion over others long after
 
the adoption of the First Amendment, and
 
these facts went unchallenged for de
 
cades. When it was adopted, the First
 
Amendment meant precisely what it said:
 
Congress could make no law respecting an
 
establishment of religion or prohibiting
 
the free exercise thereof. The states
 
were left free to deal with the problem
 
of religion and religious establishment
 
as they saw fit, under provision of their
 
constitutions.^®
 
In 1970, the new Chief Justice Warren Burger had his
 
first occasion to render an opinion on the Establishment
 
Clause. The Chief Justice portrayed the relationship
 
between church and state as one of benevolent neutrality.
 
In Walz V. Tax Commission. which concerned the
 
constitutionality of property tax exemptions given
 
religious institutions, the Chief Justice said:
 
The Establishment and Free Exercise
 
Clause of the First Amendment are not the
 
most precisely drawn portions of the
 
Constitution. The sweep of the absolute
 
prohibitions in the Religion Clauses may
 
have been calculated; but the purpose was
 
to state an objective not to write a
 
statute. In attempting to articulate
 
the scope of the two Religion Clauses,
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the Court's opinions reflect the
 
limitations inherent in formulating
 
general principles on a case-by-case
 
basis. The considerable internal
 
inconsistency in the opinions of the
 
Court derives from what, in retrospect,
 
may have been too sweeping utterances on
 
aspects of these clauses that seemed
 
clear in relation to the particular
 
cases but have limited meaning as general
 
principles. The Court has struggled to
 
find a neutral course between the two
 
Religion Clauses, both of which are cast
 
in absolute terms, and either of which,
 
if expanded to a logical extreme, would
 
tend to clash with the other.
 
The Chief Justice concluded that the Court needed to
 
adopt a more flexible balancing approach. That approach
 
was developed in succeeding decisions of the Burger Court.
 
In summary, the First Amendment has undergone a
 
similar transformation as has the Fourteenth Amendment.
 
The First Amendment, appearing from an historical
 
perspective, was meant to do two things. First it was
 
meant to forbid the establishment of a National Church.
 
Congress could not provide assistance in the establishment
 
of any church. This had only to do with our national
 
government and was in no way expected to hinder state
 
governments in their legislative capacities. Secondly,
 
in Madison's words, it was designed to:
 
... assert for ourselves a freedom to
 
embrace, to profess and to observe the
 
Religion which we believe to be Of
 
divine origin, we cannot deny an equal
 
freedom to those whose minds have not
 
yet yielded to the evidence which has
 
convinced us.^^
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Because of the transformation of the 14th Amendment,
 
the First Amendment has become vulnerable to the Supreme
 
Court's interpretation. It simply has to be seen
 
historically that the Founding Fathers' wishes and
 
opinions have not been adhered to. In the Court's quest
 
for uniformity (to maintain complete separation of
 
Church and State), it has violated the spirit of the
 
First Amendment. In reviewing the Court's cases since
 
the Hamilton case of 1934, one became aware of the
 
directionless options of the High Court's rulings. The
 
desire for continuity throughout its rulings have
 
resulted in confusion.
 
There has also been a decreasing trust and a growing
 
skepticism by the public. The incorporation of the
 
First Amendment by the Fourteenth Amendment leaving the
 
states vulnerable to the Court's rulings, and the
 
supra-legislative activity of the Court in a political
 
area of law, has contributed to the undermining of the
 
public's confidence.
 
As Jefferson wrote in his Notes on the State of
 
Virginia. "Truth can stand by itself." What is needed
 
is a return by the Court to the intentions adopted by
 
the Founding Fathers and enshrined in our Constitution.
 
The point of this section is to draw attention to
 
the fact that historically the Constitution's meaning and
 
principles have undergone a transformation and an outright
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usurpation of its legitimate power and prestige, principly
 
by a combination of legislative ambivalence and Supreme
 
Court activism. The final section will deal with some of
 
the results of the transformation and advance some
 
constitutional answers to this problem.
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Conclusion
 
It is a very evident fact that there has been, over
 
the last 200 years, a reshaping or a transformation of
 
our American Constitution. The founders would be greatly
 
surprised, to say the least, at the type of document
 
their Constitution resembles. It is now seen by a
 
majority (i.e. William Brennan) as a "lodestar": full of
 
organically changing words that can mean one thing one
 
day and something else twenty years later. It can be
 
adhered to or discarded according to the need of the
 
times. This loss of our guarantee has occurred for at
 
least three apparent reasons. The first is due to the
 
loss of principle, that at the time of the founding was
 
taken for granted: of equality and natural rights,
 
equality and Natural Rights. The principle enunciated
 
in the Declaration of Independence that says that these
 
truths are self-evident: that all men are created equal
 
and are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable
 
rights. That common knowledge held by the founders has
 
somehow escaped some of the generations, including our
 
own. Instead, a relativistic basis is now undergirding
 
our constitution, that has little to do with principles
 
and inalienable rights. The second reason for the change
 
in our Consitituion has to do with our legislative
 
branch's inability to legislate in difficult areas. The
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Fourteenth Amendments use could have been drastically
 
altered if the legislature just after the Civil War had
 
passed laws broadening the rights of blacks instead of
 
allowing inequality to persist. The Fourteenth Amendment
 
principles became an instrument of oppression and
 
unfairness that was only remedied after decades of
 
indifference. But to fault the legislative efforts in
 
these areas is only to say more should have been done and
 
could have been done in a constitutional context. The
 
problem or fault lays by far at the feet of the judiciary.
 
The supralegislative efforts by the court is well
 
documented and undeniably a fact of American consti
 
tutional history. The courts use of power to change the
 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the use of that
 
amendment to incorporate the rest of the Bill of Rights.
 
The usurpation of state power, are a few of its most
 
obvious supralegislative efforts. It has, through its
 
misuse caused an erosion of confidence by the public.
 
Especially in regard to some of its early civil rights
 
decisions about desegregation. That is not to say that
 
desegregation was not a good idea but that it was not
 
the court's right to be the branch that legislated those
 
decisions. These reasons seem to be preeminent in the
 
transformation process.
 
Where have these influences led us? The effects of
 
these changes do at least two major mischiefs. First,
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the public confidence in its government begins to erode.
 
The well balanced government designed by the founders
 
becomes unbalanced. The checks and balances devised to
 
protect the branches from one another, and ultimately to
 
protect the citizens from the government, do not work as
 
well as they should. For example, the non-elected
 
judicial branch becomes the nine man tribunal that
 
dictates policy. A non-elected, life tenured, almost
 
completely unchecked branch, not responsive to our
 
republican views becomes the catalyst of republican
 
change. It finds "new" rights in our constitution, it
 
says what the constitution really means and then presses
 
those views on its citizens. This happens while the
 
legislative branch is lagging behind unable or unwilling
 
to move in difficult areas. There must be a re-balancing
 
or realignment of our branches of government as well as a
 
rediscovery of the principles on which it is to operate.
 
What needs to be done to ensure the existence of our
 
regime? It will require a tremendous change of heart
 
and mind to see a return to our roots. We need to
 
reestablish the principle of equality as a cornerstone
 
of our regime. We need a Supreme Court that will restrain
 
itself from tampering with issues clearly legislative in
 
nature and finally a legislative branch willing to take
 
on its responsibility to be the catalyst in political
 
59
 
change. If these suggestions were followed, we would be
 
an even more tranquil, peaceful nation.
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